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THomAs C. HENxmrs, JR.*
Mallory v. United States,' decided by the Supreme Court last year,
brought once again into open debate and controversy the so-called
McNabb rule. This rule originated in McNabb v. United States2 decided
by the Court in 1943.
In 1940, when the McNabbs were arrested there were two primary
statutes requiring federal officers when making an arrest to take the
person before a committing officer. One statute required that the person
be taken before the nearest United States commissioner or nearest judicial
officer having jurisdiction for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for
trial.3 The other statute applied only to officers of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. It directed them to take the person arrested before a
committing officer immediately.4 Referring to these two statutes, in the
McNabb case, the Court said:
Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with
reasonable promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested
persons, constitutes an important safeguard-not only in assuring
protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the
guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and
self-confident society.5
The McNabbs were arrested and questioned extensively for two days
before the federal officers obtained from them satisfactory coordinated
confessions. It was not until after these confessions were obtained that
the McNabbs were taken before a committing officer. The Court held
that these confessions were not admissible, using this language:
*United States Senator; Member of the Missouri Bar; A.B., Cornell University,
1924; LL.B., Washington University, 1926.
1. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
2. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, c. 301, 28 STAT. 416, Act of May 28, 1896, c. 252, § 19, 29
STAT. 184, Act of Mar. 2, 1901, c. 814, 31 STAT. 956.
4. Act of June 18, 1934, c. 595, 48 STAT. 1008.
5. 318 U.S. at 343.
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Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through
such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has
commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the
courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law.
Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so pro-
cured. But to permit such evidence to be made the basis of a
conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which
Congress has enacted into law. 6
A new rule of evidence was now in effect-a confession obtained
before commitment is inadmissible if the arrested person was not taken
before a committing officer promptly after his arrest. The confession is
inadmissible whether voluntary or involuntary. Where there has been
an undue delay, it is no longer necessary to determine this constitutional
issue.
The McNabb rule is of particular interest to me because I have spent
six years as Assistant Circuit Attorney and two years as Circuit Attorney
in St. Louis. The many complex problems and difficulties of law enforce-
ment are only too well known to me.
That the McNabb rule has caused a certain amount of confusion is
shown by the fact that it has been the issue involved in four cases before
the Supreme Court in the fourteen years of its existence. In two of these
cases the conviction of the defendant below was reversed by the Supreme
Court and in the other two the Supreme Court held that the lower appeal
court erroneously applied the rule in reversing the trial court's conviction.
The first of these cases, United States v. Mitchell,7 came before the
Court in 1944. In this case the defendant was arrested and taken to the
police station where he confessed within a few minutes. He was then
held by the officers without being taken before a committing magistrate
for eight days in an attempt to clear up other similar crimes. The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's conviction on the ground that the con-
fession was inadmissible under the McNabb rule. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's conviction holding that the confession was
admissible. The Court said:
Here there was no disclosure induced by illegal detention,
no evidence was obtained in violation of any legal rights, but
6. Id. at 345.
7. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
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instead the consent to a search of his home, the prompt acknowl-
edgment by an accused of his guilt, and the subsequent rueing
apparently of such spontaneous cooperation and concession of
guilt.8
The Court while deeming the detention illegal, held the confession
admissible because it was made prior to the time the detention became
illegal.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective in 1946.
Rule 5 (a) provides that federal officers must take arrested persons before
a committing magistrate "without unnecessary delay." This provision has
been the basis for the application of the McNabb rule in subsequent cases.
In 1948 Upshaw v. United States9 was decided by the Supreme Court.
In this case the petitioner was arrested on suspicion without a warrant
and confessed to grand larceny thirty hours later. He was not taken
before a committing magistrate until after the confession. The Court
reversed the conviction. It distinguished the Mitchell case in which the
confession was not the result of illegal detention. It found that here the
petitioner was detained for the thirty hours for the specific purpose of
obtaining the confession, as the police lacked sufficient evidence to hold
the petitioner at the time of his arrest. The Court applied the McNabb
rule because there was an unnecessary delay before the petitioner was
taken before a committing magistrate and the confession was obtained
during this unnecessary delay. Mr. Justice Reed wrote a very complete
dissenting opinion in which he maintained that the majority opinion was
an extension of the McNabb rule. In his opinion the McNabb rule
required more than illegal detention. It required a certain amount of
psychological coercion which was found in the consistent questioning of
the McNabbs and in the refusal of the government agents to accept their
original confessions requiring further questioning until all the confes-
sions were consistent. In the Upshaw case, the Court definitely took the
position that if there is an unnecessary delay in taking an arrested person
before a committing magistrate, then any confession obtained during
the period after the delay becomes unnecessary is inadmissible, even if
the person is left alone in his cell and makes the confession completely of
his own accord.
8. Id. at 70.
9. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
1958]
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The next case before the Supreme Court in which the McNabb rule
was an issue was United States v. Carignan.10 The defendant was
arrested and promptly committed on a charge of assault with intent to
rape. Because of the similarity between this crime and an earlier one
which resulted in the murder of the victim, the police questioned the
defendant about the earlier crime while he was being legally detained
on the other charge. After two days of routine questioning the defendant
confessed to the murder and was then charged with this crime and
convicted. The trial court admitted the confession but the court of appeals
reversed the conviction on the basis of the McNabb rule. The court of
appeals held that a confession obtained after days of questioning while the
defendant is being legally held for a completely different crime is inad-
missible, because there is an unnecessary delay in commitment for the
crime to which the party confesses." The Supreme Court affirmed the
court of appeals' reversal on other grounds but held that the court of
appeals had erroneously applied the McNabb rule. The Supreme Court
held that the police could question a person held lawfully and a confes-
sion so obtained, if voluntary, is admissible even if the confessed crime is
not the crime for which the person has been charged. The McNabb rule
applies only where the confession has been obtained after there has been
an unnecessary delay in taking the person before a committing officer.
This was the status of the McNabb rule when the Mallory12 case
came before the Supreme Court last year. On April 7, 1954, a woman in
the District of Columbia went to the basement of the apartment house in
which she lived to do her laundry. She ran into difficulty detaching a
hose so she went to the janitor's basement apartment to obtain help.
Mallory, who was the half-brother of the janitor and who lived with him,
was alone in the apartment and he detached the hose for her and returned
to the apartment. Very shortly thereafter the woman was attacked by a
man wearing a mask, who had the general features of Mallory, and the
janitor's two sons who also lived with the janitor. The woman had heard
no one descend the wooden steps into the basement which was the only
entrance. Mallory and the janitor's two sons were arrested about 2:00
p.m. the next day and taken to a police station, where they were all ques-
tioned about thirty minutes. Then at 4:00 p.m. they were asked to take a
10. 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
UI. Carignan v. United States, 185 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1950).
12. Supra note 1.
[Vol. 23
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lie-detector test, to which they agreed. While waiting for the polygraph
operator to be found the three were fed; then the two sons were given the
test. Mallory was given the test from 8:00 to 9:30. Mallory and the
operator were the only ones in the room during the test. Mallory
admitted the crime during the test. Immediately after the test Mallory
repeated his confession and at 10:00 p.m., some eight hours after he was
arrested, the police attempted to find a commissioner to commit Mallory.
The police were unsuccessful in finding a commissioner at this time.
Mallory repeated his confession to several other officers, and then at
11:30 he dictated it to a typist. He was brought before a commissioner
the next morning and committed. It must be remembered that Mallory
was held by the police most of the previous afternoon in the vicinity of
numerous committing magistrates. Mallory's confession was admitted by
the trial court and he was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction. The Court held that the police may not arrest upon mere
suspicion but only on "probable cause." An arrested person is not to be
taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry that
leads itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to
support the arrest and ultimately his guilt. The Court held that police
detention of persons beyond the time when a committing magistrate is
readily accessible constitutes "willful disobedience of law" as found in
rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court said:
"Circumstances may justify a brief delay between arrest and arraign-
ment, as for instance, where the story volunteered by the accused is
susceptible of quick verification through third parties. But the delay
must not be of a nature to give opportunity for the extraction of a confes-
sion."' 3 The Court found that it could not sanction the extended delay
in this case, resulting in confession, "without subordinating the general
rule of prompt arraignment to the discretion of arresting officers in find-
ing exceptional circumstances for its disregard.... It is not the function
of the police to arrest, as it were, at large and to use an interrogating
process at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should
charge before a committing magistrate on 'probable cause.' "14
It should be noted that the "arraignment" the Court speaks of here
is not the formal pleading of "guilty" or "not guilty" which is historically
13. 354 U.S. at 455.
14. Ibid.
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referred to as the arraignment. This formal pleading by the accused
comes later in the procedure after the indictment or information has been
filed in the district court and is made before a district judge.'0 ' The
arraignment referred to in the Mallory case is the hearing before a com-
mitting officer where the complaint is read to the accused. At this hear-
ing he is informed of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent.
The date for a preliminary hearing is also set at this time if the accused
does not waive such a hearing.16
The policy behind the statutes requiring promptness in taking an
arrested person before a committing officer or, as now required, "without
unnecessary delay," has been spelled out by the Court in every case in
which the McNabb rule has been applied. For example, in the McNabb
case the Court stated:
This procedural requirement checks resort to those repre-
hensible practices known as the third degree which, though
universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use.
It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation
of persons accused of crime.' 7
The McNabb rule with its strict application in the Mallory case is the
basis of an open vocal controversy. Police and law enforcement officers
of our nation have a very difficult job. They shoulder a great responsi-
bility. They have the obligation of maintaining peace and order. They
must apprehend those who violate the law and secure evidence for their
conviction. It is only natural that they would oppose new procedural
rules or extensions of old procedural rules which set limits on their field
of operation. And the courts must seriously consider any innovation
which will make the enforcement of our criminal laws more difficult.
However, it must be remembered that the primary responsibility of our
police and law enforcement agencies is not to obtain convictions but to
see that justice is obtained.
We consider ourselves a civilized nation and therefore we aspire to
conduct ourselves in a civilized manner. The Supreme Court has never
contended that the McNabb rule was required by the Constitution. It has
said that we must have procedural safeguards which not only protect
the innocent but which secure convictions of the guilty by methods that
commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident society.
15. FE. R. Cumi. P. 10.
16. FED. R. CrIt. P. 5 (b).
17. 318 U.S. at 344.
(Vol. 23
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That arraignment without unnecessary delay is a necessary proce-
dure in a civilized society can easily be seen by a survey of several cases
which have come before the Supreme Court. These cases point out how
easily unnecessary delay can slip into psychological coercion, thereby
rendering a confession involuntary. In Haley v. Ohio'8 the defendant, a
young boy, was arrested about midnight and questioned at the police
station until morning when he confessed. He was then held incommuni-
cado for two more days before he was formally charged. The Supreme
Court found psychological coercion. In Malinski v. New York"9 the
defendant was held incommunicado for four days before arraignment, the
first day of which he was kept naked or only half clothed. In Ward v.
Texas,2 0 the defendant and several other persons were picked up on
suspicion without warrants and were held for several days. During this
time the defendant was taken from county to county until he confessed.
There are many other such cases. In all of them the defendant was picked
up by the police and held without formal commitment for some time.
During this unnecessary delay in taking the person before a committing
official the police, intentionally or otherwise, applied pressures which
resulted in an involuntary confession. The seeds of coercion sprout
readily in the earth of illegal detention.
Against this background the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Mallory case is easily understood. In view of the policy established by
Congress by rule 5 (a) and in view of our civilized society, the Supreme
Court had to hold that Mallory's confession was inadmissible.
There are a number of bills before Congress which would legislate
the McNabb rule out of existence. One would attempt to set an arbitrary
limit on the number of hours before arraignment.2 1 Others would apply
new tests, such as "voluntariness," to the admissibility of confessions,
regardless of when they were made.2 2 In my view, the McNabb rule,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is preferable to these various
proposals. Its test of reasonableness will go farther toward effective law
enforcement, and at the same time provide greater protection to the civil
liberties of the citizen suspected of a crime.
18. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
19. 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
20. 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
21. S. 2432, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
22. H.R. 8521, H.R. 8596, H.R. 8600, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
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